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Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to 
Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions 
By ANGELA A. HUNG AND CHARLES R. PLOTT* 
The research reported here was originally 
motivated by the results of Lisa R. Anderson 
and Charles A. Holt (1997), who demonstrated 
the existence of cascades in sequences of indi- 
vidual decisions. In certain environments the 
decisions of individuals tended to reflect only 
the decisions of those who went before them 
and did not reflect the information they held 
privately. Our first question was whether the 
results they reported would replicate. 
Reflections on the problem led us to realize that 
the study of cascades is a branch of three strands 
of research. While these strands of research have 
similarities, they tend to reflect differences about 
the principles governing behavior. The first strand 
of research is the conformity or "herding" re- 
search which is focused primarily on models that 
might explain similarities in individual choices 
or interdependencies of preferences. Typically 
the phenomenon is called "herds," "fads," or 
"conformity," which reflects a concern with "in- 
correct" or "wrong" cascades, despite the rec- 
ognition that cascades can result from rational, 
Bayesian-Nash behavior. Even though the liter- 
ature is less dramatic, it is easy to liken the 
behavior to lemmings in which each follows the 
one ahead over a cliff and falls to its death, all 
of which suggests that the behavior is viewed as 
being somewhat dysfunctional. 
Aspects of the second strand of research, the 
information aggregation literature, are fre- 
quently employed in the first strand. However, 
when viewed independently as an information 
aggregation issue, the topic of cascades is ap- 
proached differently and aspects of market sta- 
bility also become involved.' Cascade behavior 
is a Pareto improvement over behavior in which 
individuals base decisions only on their private 
information, since a cascade reflects an integra- 
tion of more private information than any single 
individual possesses. However, all information 
is not integrated into a cascading system and the 
pattern of decisions themselves do not summa- 
rize and publicize a summary of private infor- 
mation as prices can do in markets. The 
phenomena involves an information extemality 
or public good inefficiency problem fostered by 
the nature of the decision-making institutions 
and environment. The private information of 
those who make decisions, after the first person 
or two, is not made available to those who 
follow. Some of the early decision makers fail 
to contribute to the "public good" of pooled 
information.2 Thus, the information aggregation 
literature leads naturally to questions about the 
role of institutions and the efficiency of the 
system in both an allocation sense and in an 
information sense. 
The third strand of literature also leads to 
issues about institutions as well as the underly- 
ing reasons for the observed patterns of behav- 
ior. Cascades were observed many years ago by 
social psychologists, although they were given 
other names. Psychologists distinguished be- 
tween conformity due to integration of private 
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information with information inferred from oth- 
ers' behavior, "informational social influence," 
and conformity that results from an internal 
motivation to conform to the perceived norms 
of the group, "normative social influence."3 
Normative social influence includes the possi- 
bility that individuals sometimes find them- 
selves in situations where they will be punished 
by the group if they do not conform. Confor- 
mity might be rewarding regardless of the in- 
formation that exists. 
The experiments reported here can be viewed 
as a study of the relationships among institu- 
tions and the "cascade phenomenon." The ex- 
periments can also be viewed as a narrowing of 
the potential theories of behavior while using 
the study of specific institutions to facilitate the 
task. The experiments focused on three different 
types of institutions consisting of different rules 
and organization. (1) Agents were rewarded ac- 
cording to whether their announced decision 
was right or wrong. This organization is the 
"individualistic institution" studied by Ander- 
son and Holt (1997). (2) Agents were rewarded 
according to whether a majority of announced 
decisions were right or wrong under the "ma- 
jority rule institution." (3) Agents are rewarded 
more according to whether their personal an- 
nounced decision was the same as the major- 
ity decision than they were rewarded for a cor- 
rect decision under the "conformity-rewarding 
institution." 
The paper poses three fundamental questions. 
First, do the results of Anderson and Holt rep- 
licate? The second question is related to the 
organization of the decision process, the rules 
that are in place governing individual rewards 
and incentives. Do the rules make a difference? 
Third, can the influence of the organization be 
detected in models of individual decisions? 
That is, can we further narrow the class of 
possible explanations for cascade behavior? 
The candidates include (i) a preference for con- 
formity (ii) Bayesian-Nash equilibrium behav- 
ior, (iii) nonequilibrium Bayesian behavior, and 
(iv) various heuristics. Anderson and Holt were 
able to reject (iv) in favor of the other classes, 
but in their experiments they were unable to say 
which, if any, of the others might be operating 
to account for the data. Part of this paper is to 
further narrow the class of potential explana- 
tions with respect to experiments. 
Our results are outlined as follows. First, the 
Anderson and Holt observation that information 
cascades will occur in particular environments 
is strongly upheld by the experiments we re- 
port.4 When the individual's payoff is deter- 
mined by his/her own announced decisions, 
then individuals tend to treat their private signal 
as ilTelevant and follow the trend of their pre- 
decessors, if a clear pattern is present. Second, 
we find that relative to the individualistic insti- 
tution studied by Anderson and Holt, the pre- 
dominance of information cascades sharply 
decreases with the change in institution to a 
majority rule process. The data reported here 
are consistent with the data from experiments of 
majority rule jury decisions studied by Richard 
D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1998a). 
Furthermore, the tendency to cascade increases 
when the conformity-rewarding institution is 
implemented. Following David M. Grether 
(1980), we begin to explore the quantitative 
effects of changes in institution on the nature of 
individual decisions. While the model we ex- 
plore is clearly incomplete, it provides a frame- 
work within which individual decisions are 
understandable. Finally, we can rule out expla- 
nations (i), a preference for conformity, and 
(iii), nonequilibrium Bayesian behavior, as ex- 
planations for cascade behavior. 
The paper is divided into seven sections. Sec- 
tion I discusses the institutions. Section II is the 
experimental design. Section III is an outline of 
measures of information production. This is the 
information that participants in the process and 
an outside observer of the process might infer 
from behavior. Section IV is a model that re- 
flects how individuals use information. While 
we have no complete theory of individual be- 
havior, this section develops a model that facil- 
itates interpretations. Section V summarizes 
interpretations of the model introduced in the 
previous section. Section VI summarizes the 
results, and Section VII concludes. 
3 A good introduction to the way psychologists have 
studied this problem is contained in Eliot Aronson, et al. 
(1997). 
4The Anderson and Holt results have also been repli- 
cated by Marc Willinger and Anthony Ziegelmeyer (1998). 
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I. Institutions: The Rules and Procedures 
In all of the institutions studied here the tech- 
nology of communication is the same. Each 
agent was given an independent, private signal 
about which of two states had been chosen by a 
random draw. After receiving the private signal, 
each agent was called upon according to a ran- 
domly determined sequence to announce a de- 
cision about the state. That is, the individual's 
decision was publicly announced before a deci- 
sion was made by the succeeding individual. 
Thus, at the time of personal decision each 
agent had a private signal and also knew the 
decisions of all preceding agents. The decision 
of an individual was not necessarily a report of 
the individual's private information, but instead 
was an announcement that would have an influ- 
ence on the individual's payoff. The agent was 
aware of the rules that governed the relation- 
ships among announced decisions and individ- 
ual payoffs. He also knows that all decision 
makers operate under the same conditions. 
Thus, by changing the rules while maintaining 
the communications technology, we are able to 
gain insights about the relationships among in- 
formation derived from the behavior of others, 
incentives, and private information. 
The Individualistic Institution.-The first set 
of rules, which we call the "individualistic insti- 
tution," are those studied by Anderson and Holt. 
When individuals make decisions they have their 
own private information plus the information 
contained in the decisions of those who made 
decisions in the past. Furthermore, aside from 
information (externality) issues, the effects of an 
individual's decisions are confined to the individ- 
ual who makes the decision. Examples include 
models of job search, financial markets, fads, and 
herd behavior (see Bikhchandani et al., 1992 or 
1998 for an overview of applications). 
The Majority Rule Institution.-The second 
set of rules is the collective decision rule of 
majority rule. The frequency with which major- 
ity rule is used to make important decisions 
makes it a natural candidate for study. The 
individual announced decisions become votes 
which tie the consequences of individuals to- 
gether in the sense that all individuals must 
abide by the same decision and that is the de- 
cision of a majority. Individuals are given the 
latitude of how they vote in the context of this 
group decision but they cannot make indepen- 
dent payoff relevant decisions apart from the 
vote. The study of majority rule has theoretical 
interest. In particular it is nonmanipulable so 
there is a presumption that the "best informa- 
tion" will be produced. 
Conformity-Rewarding Institution.-The third 
rule is a rule in which there are special incentives 
to conform to the decision of a majority. In this 
environment individuals have an incentive to be 
right but they have a bigger incentive to not de- 
viate from the decisions of others. 
Pressures to conform to group behaviors have 
been widely discussed for many decades. For 
example, the early literature on cascades was 
viewed as a study of conformity resulting from 
the nature of groups and social interaction (So- 
lomon E. Asch, 1958). In addition, groups are 
viewed as "punishing" deviates thereby provid- 
ing private incentives for individuals to con- 
form to the patterns of behavior of others in the 
group (Stanley Schachter, 1951). 
Political processes and perhaps even mana- 
gerial organizations involve themselves in insti- 
tutions that result in the punishment of 
individuals whose opinions deviate from the 
group. For example, the punishments can exist 
in the form of distrust or lack of confidence in 
those whose opinions and voting patterns are 
different from those of the majority. Promotions 
and standing within an organization can be af- 
fected. In some cases, the pressure to conform 
can be tied closely to procedures such as in the 
case of grand jury procedures in which charges 
of perjury may result from testimony that differs 
from the testimony of others. Thus, personal 
rewards and punishments are closely tied to 
consistency with the decisions and recorded 
opinions of others, independent of whether such 
decisions and opinions are closely tied to the 
truth. As can be seen, in some cases the incen- 
tives to conform are natural properties of indi- 
vidual preferences, and in other cases they are 
derived from the properties of the institutions. 
11. Experimental Design 
Four experiments were conducted in the Lab- 
oratory for Experimental Economics and Polit- 
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TABLE 1-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Periods in which institution is in effect 
Experiment Individualistic Majority Conformity Payoffs Computer 
1 1-28 $2, 0 No 
2 1-10, 26-36 11-25 $2, -2 Yes 
3 11-25 1-10, 26-38 $1, -1 Yes 
4 16-30, 46-55 1-15, 31-45 $0.75, -0.75 / $0.25, -0.25 Yes 
ical Science at Caltech. Each experiment had 
ten Caltech undergraduates as subjects. The ex- 
periments consisted of 28-55 periods and lasted 
for about one and a half hours. The procedures 
described below were adapted from those used 
by Anderson and Holt (1997). Some changes 
reflect employment of computers. The instruc- 
tions used in the experiments are available upon 
request. The nature of incentives were changed 
to save money. The four experiments are sum- 
marized in Table 1. 
Experiment 1 most closely resembles the ex- 
periments of Anderson and Holt. In experiment 
1, the urn that was to be used each period was 
randomly predetermined. Urn A contained two 
RED balls and one WHITE ball, and urn B 
contained two WHITE balls and one RED ball. 
Each period, the contents of the chosen urn 
were emptied into an unmarked container. Sub- 
jects were then approached in a random order 
by the experimenter and would make one pri- 
vate draw, with replacement. After seeing the 
draw, the subject was asked to record his deci- 
sion on a record sheet and also the color of the 
draw. The experimenter then announced the de- 
cision, and all the subjects would record this 
decision on their record sheets. The process was 
repeated until all subjects had made decisions, 
at which time the actual urn used was an- 
nounced. Subjects were asked to record their 
earnings: $2 if their decision was correct, and 
$0 otherwise. Experiment 1 consisted of 28 
periods. 
In experiment 2, the procedure was the same, 
except that subjects interacted with computer 
terminals rather than the experimenter. A sub- 
ject is "approached" by the computer and given 
a draw by an announcement of "Your draw is 
WHITE" or "Your draw is RED." After seeing 
the draw, subjects were then asked to enter their 
decision into a box on the screen. All the sub- 
jects would then see this decision on their 
screens. As before, subjects were asked to 
record their draws, their own decisions, and the 
decisions of others on a record sheet. This pro- 
cess was repeated until all subjects had made 
decisions, at which time the actual urn used 
would appear on the subjects' screens. In peri- 
ods 1-10 and 26-36, the "individualistic" peri- 
ods, subjects would also see their payoff on the 
screen, $2 for a correct decision, and - $2 
otherwise. In periods 11-25, the "majority" 
periods, subjects would see the "group deci- 
sion" as well as their payoff on the screen. 
The group decision was determined by major- 
ity rule, with ties broken randomly. Subjects 
were paid $2 for a correct group decision, and 
-$2 for an incorrect decision, regardless of 
their own decision.5 
Experiment 3 differed from experiment 2 in 
that periods 1-10 and 26-38 were "majority" 
periods, and periods 11-25 were "individualis- 
tic" periods. Subjects were paid $1 for a correct 
decision or corTect group decision, and -$1 
otherwise. 
In experiment 4, we introduce the "confor- 
mity-rewarding" institution. In these rounds, the 
payoff to a subject is determined by whether her 
private decision is correct, and also if her pri- 
vate decision matches the group decision, where 
once again, the group decision is determined by 
majority rule. Subjects are paid $0.25 for a 
correct private decision and -$0.25 for an in- 
correct decision, and they are paid $0.75 for a 
5 In the "individualistic" rounds, the instructions read: 
"You earn $2 for each decision that matched the urn that 
was actually used. Otherwise you lose $2." In the "majority 
rule" periods, the instructions regarding earnings read: 
"Your earnings are determined as follows: If the majority of 
the group decisions match the urn that was actually used, 
then you earn $2. Otherwise, you lose $2." 
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private decision that matches the group decision 
and -$0.75 for a private decision that does not 
match the group decision.6 
III. Three Measures of System Performance 
The literature seems to assume that cascades 
indicate poor information production and use 
within the system, which leads to poor system 
performance. However, this assumption is not 
entirely correct. Cascade behavior can result in 
better decisions than purely individualistic de- 
cisions because it does involve aspects of infor- 
mation aggregation. Thus in order to assess 
such possibilities, we explore two related mea- 
sures of systemic performance in addition to the 
traditional measure of cascades: the efficiency 
of systemic decisions and the quality of infor- 
mation production. 
Traditional Information Cascades.-The con- 
sensus in the literature is that a cascade is de- 
fined by a sequence of individuals whose 
decisions do not depend on their private infor- 
mation (see Bikhchandani et al., 1992 or Lones 
Smith and Peter S0rensen, 2000). Following 
Anderson and Holt, we add the additional stip- 
ulation (that is usually implicit in the definition) 
that a cascade is defined by an established pat- 
tern of decisions together with the presence of 
subsequent decisions that are consistent with 
this pattern, but inconsistent with the private 
draws. 
Efficiency of Systemic Decisions.-The con- 
cept of efficiency rests on the concept of the 
fully informed decision. The fully informed de- 
cision is the decision that an expected utility 
maximizer would make if he had access to all 
private information in the system, the entire 
sequence of true signals. 
The systemic decision is a function of the 
subjects' actual decisions. For the individualis- 
tic and conformity-rewarding institutions, the 
systemic decision is the vector of the individu- 
als' announcements. However, for the majority 
rule institution the individual announcements 
are, in effect, votes that determine the unique 
systemic decision. 
Let ai be individual i's announcement in a 
given period for i E {1.1O, IO} . The systemic 
decision in that period is a function of the vector 
of the individual's announcements, G(al,..., a10), 
where the function G depends on the institution: 
G(ai,..., alolindividualistic) = 
= G(a,.., alo|confoimity rewarding) 
= (a,, ..., a10). 
G(al, ..., alolmajority rule) 
=(a. ...a o ), 
where a is the majority winner of the announce- 
ments in the period. In the case of a tie, the 
majority winner is chosen randomly. 
The efficiency of systemic decision is mea- 
sured each period as the proportion of the sys- 
temic decisions that match the fully informed 
decision.7 The efficiency of systemic decisions 
in the period is: 
10 
E 1 {Gi= a*} 
efficiency 10 
where 1{ } is the indicator function and Gi is 
individual i's component of the systemic deci- 
sion in the period, and a* is the fully informed 
decision of the period. 
Information Production Quality.-Another 
measure of system performance is the amount 
of the underlying information of the system that 
is exposed to an outside observer. The concept 
is taken from economics where informational 
efficiency is related to whether or not the prices 6 For the "conformity-rewarding" institution, the instruc- 
tions read: "Your earnings are determined as follows: If 
your decision matches the urn that was actually used, then 
you earn $0.25. Otherwise you lose $0.25. In addition, if 
your decision matches the majority of the group's decisions, 
then you earn an additional $0.75. Otherwise you lose an 
additional $0.75." 
7This measure of efficiency is not weighted by the 
payoffs resulting from correct or incorrect decisions. The 
focus is on the information alone and not its economic 
value. 
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are "fully revealing." Consider an observer who 
is outside of the decision process and, from only 
the announcements of the subjects, must make 
inferences about the true state of the world. 
Assume that each subject's announcement re- 
flects the state of the world that he thinks is 
most likely. The outside observer's posterior 
probabilities of the true state are compared with 
those of an observer who can observe all the 
private signals. The information production 
quality is inversely related to the absolute dif- 
ference between the posterior probabilities of an 
outside observer who observes only the entire 
sequence of announcements and the posterior 
probabilities of an outside observer who ob- 
serves the entire sequence of private signals. 
The best information production quality has a 
quality of one, and the worst has a quality of 
zero: 
IPQ = 1- JPr(Alal, ..., alo) 
- Pr(Ald1, ..., dio)I 
where al,..., a10 is the sequence of announce- 
ments in a given period and d1,..., d10 is the 
sequence of private draws in the period. 
IV. Information Use: The General Decision 
Weight Model 
One way to capture the effects of the in- 
stitution is in terms of individual behavior. We 
do not have a good understanding of exactly 
why individuals behave as they do, but the 
General Decision Weight model will help us 
detect when they are behaving differently and 
how their behavior differs under different 
institutions. 
Before announcing an urn, a subject has two 
sources of information: her private draw, and 
the announcements of those who preceded her. 
The General Decision Weight model is con- 
structed on the premise that a subject's an- 
nouncement is based on these two sources. 
Given a pattern of announcements, the model 
allocates weight that a subject places on her 
public information (the preceding announce- 
ments) relative to the weight that she places 
on her private information in making her 
announcement. 
Let A be the event that urn A is the true urn, 
and B be the event that urn B is the true urn. The 
relative odds in favor of A can be expressed as: 
P(A)I1 - P(A) = P(A)IP(B). Clearly, the 
odds depend on the information available. Let 
xit = (ait, dit) be the information that individ- 
ual i has at position t. Let ait denote the an- 
nouncements that individual i has heard at 
position t, and let dit denote the private draw of 
individual i at position t. Assume ait and dit are 
independent (conditional on a given urn). Then 
the individual's subjective posterior odds in fa- 
vor of urn A are given as: 
P(Alxit) P(xitlA)P(A) 
P(Blxit) P(xitIB)P(B) 
P(aitlA) P(ditlA) P(A) 
P(aitlB) P(ditlB) P(B) 
Take logs and generalize: 
(1) Yit = a + ln [P(aItB)l 
+ 1 IIIP(ditl,A) ] + ut 
where Yit = ln[P(A!xit)IP(BJxit)]; a, 1B, and y 
are unknown scalars; and uit is a random 
disturbance.8 
We do not observe the subjective log odds 
Yit. If we assume that the individual chooses the 
urn believed to be most likely, we observe the 
discrete variable Y*, which equals one if Yit is 
positive ("A" is announced), and zero otherwise. 
The parameters of this binary response model 
may be estimated by maximum likelihood under 
distributional assumptions on uit, given that the 
matrix of independent variables is of full rank.9 
Grether (1980) used this model to study 
Bayesian updating in a similar experimental 
8 Note that In [p P =0 because P(A) = P(B) = 2 
9 For the "private-information" variable, the variable as- 
sociated with the coefficient y, we assume that subjects are 
Bayesian. That is, if di, = R, then In P djj)] 
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setting. Following Grether (1980), we estimate a 
logit model under the assumption that the distur- 
bances ui, are identically and independently dis- 
tributed logistic with mean zero. Without ftrither 
assumptions on this distribution, the parameters a, 
1B, y are identified only up to an unknown scale. 
However, identification up to an unknown scale is 
sufficient for our analysis. 
We can interpret the parameter 1B as the 
weight that an individual places on the public 
information available when making her deci- 
sion. Similarly, the parameter y is the weight 
that an individual places on the private infor- 
mation when making her decision. Therefore, if 
the individual weighs public information more 
than private information, then 0 > 1; if he 
weighs private information more than public 
information, then 9 < 1. 
V. Measurement Interpretation 
The general decision weight model serves 
two functions. The first is to capture important 
elements of individual behavior. The second is 
to relate behavior to institutional context so that 
the influence of institutions can be detailed. 
Four polar cases are of interest. These are in- 
terpreted as follows. 
Private-Information Revealer.-Suppose ev- 
eryone's announcement perfectly matches his 
private draw. In terms of the general decision 
weight model, if subjects are acting as pri- 
vate-information revealers, we would expect to 
find that 13 is not significantly different from 
zero. 
Public-Information Follower.-If the an- 
nouncement of a subject other than the first person 
perfectly matches the public information available 
at the time, then at an individual level, we would 
expect to see little weight being put on private 
information; that is, we would expect to find that 
-y is not significantly different from zero. 
Naive Bayesians.-Suppose subjects are "na- 
ive Bayesians" in the sense that the subjects 
take into account both private and public infor- 
mation in making their announcements, but this 
is not common knowledge. An individual be- 
lieves that the announcements that he has heard 
perfectly match the private draws of his prede- 
cessors. However, his own decision is based 
solely on his posterior subjective probabilities 
that are updated every period using Bayes' Law, 
taking into account both private and public in- 
formation. These individuals place equal weight 
on public and private information. If the sub- 
jects act as naive Bayesians, then the hypothesis 
1B = y can not be rejected. 
Strategic Players.-Consider subjects who 
are strategic: they respond to their incentives, 
they take into account both public and private 
information before making their announce- 
ments, there is a nonzero probability that they 
may make errors and they believe that other 
subjects behave the same way.10 This pattern of 
behavior is hard to detect unless an institutional 
comparison is made. 
In the individualistic institution, subjects 
place more weight on private than on public 
information for two reasons. First, there is some 
probability that previous announcements reflect 
some error. Second, because other subjects are 
acting strategically as well, the announcements 
do not perfectly reveal private signals. In fact, 
they realize that once a cascade has started, 
subsequent announcements which follow the 
cascade reveal no new information. For strate- 
gic players in the individualistic institution, the 
hypothesis that 0 < 1 can not be rejected. 
'y 
= ln[ = In 2 and if di W, then np(dB) 
= In[2 = -In 2. 
_3 j 
The "public-information" variable is calculated using the 
following formula: if nit and mi, are the number of "urn A" 
and "urn B" announcements, respectively, that individual i 
has heard when he is called upon to make his report his 
decision at position t, then In [ = ln[-u]= 
(n,, - mi,) In 2. 
10 Their behavior is essentially Bayesian-Nash equilib- 
rium behavior, but with Quantal Response equilibrium-type 
errors. See McKelvey and Palfrey (1998b). Anderson and 
Holt (1997) estimate this sort of model, where errors 
are assumed to be distributed according to the logistic 
distribution. 
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The majority rule mechanism, as mentioned 
above, is an incentive-compatible mechanism. 
In the context of a majority rule decision-mak- 
ing system, given a belief that others are doing 
the same, it is in the subjects' best interest to 
announce the state of the world reflected by 
their private information alone."1 Therefore, 
strategic players should act as private-informa- 
tion revealers in the majority rule case. 
Given the belief that others are behaving the 
same, a strategic player in the conformity-reward- 
ing institution will attempt to match the majority 
winner of the announcements of all individuals 
who precede him as well as those who follow. 
Strategic players in the conformity-rewarding in- 
stitution should therefore act as public-informa- 
tion revealers. In fact Bayes-Nash equilibrium 
behavior predicts that this behavior should begin 
with the second decision maker whose decision 
should always follow the first. This prediction 
follows from the fact that the strategic player 
knows other strategic players will follow. 
VI. Results 
A. Data Examples 
Consider some examples of periods from the 
actual experiments. The columns represent the 
order in which individuals saw their draws and 
made their announcements. The first row is the 
private draw of the individual. A draw that sug- 
gests urn A is listed as "a" and a draw that sug- 
gests urn B is listed as "b.",12 The second row 
gives the announcements of the individuals as "A" 
or "B" depending on the urn they chose. The 
relative odds of urn A given the private draw are 
given in row three. Row four gives the relative 
odds of urn A given the announcements heard up 
to that point, assuming that all previous announce- 
ments perfectly reveal the private signal. 
In experiment 1, period 10, in which the indi- 
vidualistic institution was in effect, we observe a 
partial cascade. The eighth announcement reflects 
cascades behavior: his announcement is inconsis- 
tent with his private draw, but consistent with the 
majority of the preceding announcements. How- 
ever, the fourth announcement is consistent with 
the private draw, despite the s redominance of 
preceding "B" announcements. 
Both measures of system performance are 
high in this period. The fully informed decision 
is "B," which follows from the fact that seven 
private draws were "b" and three were "a." 
Therefore, the efficiency of systemic decisions, 
the proportion of decisions that match the fully 
informed decision is 0.8. Furthermore, the in- 
formation production quality is 0.96. 
INDIVIDUALISTIC INSTITUTION, EXPERIMENT 1, PERIOD 10 
cas- 
1st 2"'d 3rd 4th 5th 6" 7th 8" 9th 10t" actual cade? 
private 
draw a b b a b b b a b b 
announce- 
ment A B B A B B B B B B B partial 
Pr(A Id,) 21 1 21 1 1 1 1 
Pr(Bld,) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Pr(A|a,) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pr(Bla,) 121 1 2 4 8 16 32 
at= announcements that have been made by position t, 
d,= private draw at position t. 
In experiment 3, period 30, in which the major- 
ity rule institution is in place, there is no cas- 
cade. Every subject's announcement perfectly 
matches her private draw. In this case, the effi- 
ciency of systemic decisions is 1.0, and the 
information production quality is 1.0. 
MAJORITY RULE INSTITUTION, EXPERIMENT 3, PERIOD 30 
cas- 
1st 2"d 3rd 4th 5st 6th 7th gtl 9tl lot/h actual cade? 
private 
draw a a a a a b a a a b 
announce- 
ment A A A A A B A A A B A no 
Pr(AId,) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Pr(Bld,)22 
Pr(ABa,) 1 2 4 8 16 32 16 32 64 128 
a,= announcements that have been made by position t, 
d,= private draw at position t. 
1 For a theoretical proof of existence of this equilibrium 
under a majority rule institution with sequential voting, see 
Eddie Dekel and Michele Piccione (1997) or Mark Fey (1998). 
12 The draw was actually either a RED ball (which 
suggests urn A) or a WHITE ball (which suggests urn B). 
13 Given that "cascade" is not a very precise concept, es- 
pecially when the posterior probabilities are equal, some may 
argue that round 10 is a full (rather than partial) cascade. 
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TABLE 2-LOGIT REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
n a ,3 -y Log-likelihood 
Individualistic Overall 890 0.062 1.142 3.046 -219.4749 
(0.124) (0.088) (0.225) 
Expl 280 0.011 0.904 3.382 -62.4918 
(0.235) (0.131) (0.420) 
Exp2 210 -0.225 1.273 2.790 -54.8688 
(0.251) (0.194) (0.452) 
Exp3 150 0.564 1.708 4.266 -24.603 
(0.387) (0.358) (0.858) 
Exp4 250 0.155 1.149 2.794 -68.503 
(0.220) (0.167) (0.385) 
Majority rule Overall 380 -0.001 0.523 3.89 -88.1445 
(0.212) (0.109) (0.342) 
Exp2 150 -0.112 0.624 3.139 -47.1357 
(0.277) (0.161) (0.450) 
Exp3 230 0.250 0.457 4.793 -35.8739 
(0.368) (0.162) (0.583) 
Conformity rewarding Overall 300 -0.026 4.063 3.293 -26.1855 
(0.359) (0.839) (0.742) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
In experiment 4, period 10, in which the 
conformity-rewarding institution is in place, 
dramatic cascade behavior occurs. All but three 
of the announcements are inconsistent with the 
private draw. The efficiency of systemic deci- 
sions is 0.3 and the information production 
quality is 0.06. 
CONFORMITY-REWARDING STITUTION, EXPERIMENT 4, 
PERIOD 10 
ac- cas- 
Ist 2t'd 3rd 4th 5tl 6th 7th 8tth 9tJi Ioth tual cade? 
private 
draw a b b b a b b b a b 
announce- 
ment A A A A A A A A A A B yes 
Pr(AId,) 2 12 1 1 1 2 1 
Pr(B|d,) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Pr(A la,) 
Pr(Bla ) 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 
a, = announcements that have been made by position t, 
d,= private draw at position t. 
B. Statements of Results 
The cascade phenomenon described by 
Anderson and Holt is replicated in these exper- 
iments. A prevalence of cascade behavior is 
observed in the periods in which the individu- 
alistic institution is in place. As summarized by 
the following result, the phenomenon is ob- 
served even though different subject pools, in- 
structions, and procedures are in place. 
RESULT 1: The Anderson and Holt results are 
replicated for the individualistic institution. 
Furthermore, their results are robust to 
changes in payoffs and experimental settings. 
SUPPORT: 
In 77.5 percent of individualistic institution 
rounds, we observe cascade behavior; that is, 
we see reports that are inconsistent with the 
private draw, but are consistent with a pattern 
established by the predecessors.'4 
Of course it is important to make sure that a 
fundamental bias is not the explanation for the 
observation of cascades. Estimation of the Gen- 
eral Decision Weight Model can reveal the oc- 
currence of a bias toward one urn or the other. 
Table 2 presents the results of estimation of the 
General Decision Weight Model (equation 1). 
We do not find any bias toward one urn or the 
other. 
14 Note that in reporting the proportion of cascades, 
Anderson and Holt begin by eliminating rounds in which 
there is not "an imbalance of previous inferred signals." 
However, in reporting our results, we include all rounds, not 
just rounds in which an "imbalance" occurs. 
VOL. 91 NO. 5 HUNG AND PLOTT: INFORMATION CASCADES 1517 
RESULT 2: The cascade phenomena is not 
due to an urn bias. 
SUPPORT: 
We find that, in equation 1, Ho: a = 0 
cannot be rejected at any reasonable signifi- 
cance level. 
The next result establishes that behavior 
responds to institutions. In particular, using 
the measure of individual behavior found in 
Table 2, we rule out the simple patterns of 
behavior: the private-information revealer, 
the public-information follower, and the na- 
ive Bayesian. This result acquires additional 
significance in light of the fact that the in- 
structions could be interpreted as having an 
institutional-neutrality bias.15 
RESULT 3: Individuals do not exhibit constant 
behavior across all institutions as private- 
information revealers nor as public-information 
followers. Furthermore, we can reject the naive 
Bayesian pattern of behavior for the individu- 
alistic and majority rule institutions. 
SUPPORT: 
We reject the private-information revealer 
pattern: the hypothesis f3 = 0 is rejected at the 
1-percent significance level for the individual- 
istic and majority rule institutions, and is re- 
jected at the 5-percent significance level for the 
conformity-rewarding institution. We test the 
hypothesis that individuals are public-informa- 
tion followers. That is, we test Ho : y = 0 
where y is the estimate of the coefficient on 
private information for positions 2-10 only, be- 
cause the first mover every period has no public 
information, and therefore, cannot be a public- 
information revealer. We reject the null at all 
reasonable levels of significance. Lastly, we 
reject that individuals act as naive Bayesians 
(Ho : f3 = y) at all reasonable levels of signif- 
icance for the individualistic and majority rule 
institutions. 
We have shown that we can rule out theories 
which predict any of the three stylized patterns 
of behavior in which the institution has no ef- 
TABLE 3-EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: OCCURRENCE OF 
INFORMATION CASCADES AND MEASURES OF SYSTEM 
PERFORMANCE 
Cascades Efficiency IPQ 
_ Percent 
Institution Y occurrence Means 
Individualistic 7 = 0.3749 77.5 0.817 0.85 
Majority rule r = 0.1344 39 0.943 0.98 
Conformity 
rewarding = 1.2338 96.7 0.75 0.70 
fect. Now we turn our attention to the differ- 
ences in behavior and information production 
that can be attributed to the change in institu- 
tion. Table 3 summarizes Results 4 and 5. 
RESULT 4: Institutions change the informa- 
tion production of the system and the use of 
information by the individual. The pattern of 
individual behavior is that suggested by a the- 
ory of strategic agents. 
1. Cascades observed can be ordered from 
least to most frequent depending on the in- 
stitution that is in place: majority rule, indi- 
vidualistic, conformity rewarding. 
2. Individual expressions (decisions and votes) 
reflect private information the most (in de- 
scending order): majority rule, individualis- 
tic, conformity rewarding. 
3. The weight placed on publicly available in- 
formation relative to the weight placed on 
privately available information increases as 
we change the institution from majority rule 
to the individual decision setting to the con- 
formity-rewarding rule. 
4. Under the conformity-rewarding institution, 
cascades begin with the second decision 
maker as predicted by Bayesian-Nash equi- 
librium behavior. 
SUPPORT: 
For each of the above results, we find that: 
1. 39 percent of majority rule rounds, 77.5 per- 
cent of individualistic institution rounds, 
and 96.7 percent of conformity-rewarding 
rounds result in cascades or partial cascades. 
2. 92 percent of announcements in majority 
15 Constant across institutions were the instructions that 
subjects should try to guess the "urn that he or she thinks is 
more likely to have been used." 
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rule rounds, 85 percent of announcements in 
individualistic institution rounds, and 64.7 
percent of announcements in conformity-re- 
warding rounds are signal revealing. 
3. Under majority rule, subjects place more 
than seven times as much weight on private 
information than on public information: C = 
0.13. Subjects place more than twice as 
much weight on private than on public in- 
formation under the individualistic institu- 
tion: C = 0.37. Only under the conformity- 
rewarding institution do subjects place more 
weight on public than on private informa- 
tion: 1.24. 
4. Consider the case in which the draw of the 
second person contradicts the announcement 
of the first person. In such cases the percent- 
ages of the second announcement hat match 
the first announcement are 10.8 percent, 15.8 
percent, and 72.2 percent for the individual- 
istic, majority rule, and conformity-reward- 
ing institutions, respectively. 
We now explore the additional measures of 
system performance. To measure the efficiency 
of systemic decisions, we calculate the propor- 
tion of decisions that coincide with the fully 
informed decision, the decision that an omni- 
scient agent would make if he knew the entire 
sequence of signals. Periods in which the pos- 
teriors used in calculating the fully informed 
decision equal 0.5 were omitted. 
RESULT 5: We can rank the institutions in the 
order of highest to lowest efficiency of systemic 
decision: majority rule, individualistic, and 
conformity rewarding. Similarly, the institu- 
tions in the order of highest to lowest informa- 
tion production quality are majority rule, 
individualistic, and conformity rewarding. 
SUPPORT: 
The means of the proportions of systemic 
decisions that match the fully informed deci- 
sion for the individualistic, majority rule, and 
conformity-rewarding institutions, respectively, 
are 0.82, 0.94, and 0.74 (Table 3). In fact, with 
only two exceptions, the efficiency of systemic 
decision equals one under the majority rule insti- 
tution. Under the individualistic institution, we 
see an increase in the number of efficiencies that 
fall below 0.5. Under the conformity-rewarding 
institution, we find the efficiencies are lower, on 
average, than the other institutions. Further- 
more, we find high variation: all the efficiencies 
lie at one extreme or the other (greater than or 
equal to 0.8 or less than or equal to 0.1). 
The average information production quality 
is 0.98 under the majority rule institution 
(Table 3). This is not surprising given that 92 
percent of the announcements are signal re- 
vealing. The average absolute difference be- 
tween the posterior probabilities given the 
private signals and the posterior probabilities 
given the announcements under the individu- 
alistic institution is more than twice as large 
as under the majority rule institution, and is 
reflected by a quality of information produc- 
tion of 0.85. Lastly, under the conformity- 
rewarding institution, the average absolute 
difference is twice that of the individualistic 
institution: 0.30, and therefore, the quality of 
information production is 0.70. In fact, we 
find 20 percent of the periods have posteriors 
that differ by more than 0.5 points. 
VII. Conclusion 
While keeping the technologies of communi- 
cation constant, we examine the effects on in- 
formation aggregation and production under 
three different institutions: the individualistic 
institution, which is that studied by Anderson 
and Holt (1997), the majority rule institution, 
and the conformity-rewarding institution. The 
results of Anderson and Holt replicate (Result 
1). In our experiments we observe the phenom- 
ena they report. The experiments reported here 
reflect a different subject pool, different proce- 
dures, computerized processes, different pay- 
offs, and many other things. It follows that the 
Anderson and Holt discovery is robust to 
changes in these classes of variables. 
We find marked changes in individual behav- 
ior and information production due to the 
change in institution. Individual decisions 
change as institutions change and examination 
of these changes helps us further narrow the 
class of explanations for cascade behavior. In- 
dividuals do not follow simple rules of thumb 
such as mimicking behavior or full truthful rev- 
elation. The ability to rule these out follows 
from the changes of individual rules in response 
to the changes of institution. We can also rule 
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out a preference for conformity and nonequilib- 
rium Bayesian behavior (Result 3). 
Furthermore, the differences in behavior due 
to the institution follow an understandable pat- 
tern. The weight that individuals place on public 
information, relative to private information, in 
making decisions is highest under the confor- 
mity-rewarding institution; indeed, this is the 
only institution under which public information 
is weighed more than private information. At 
the other extreme, under the majority rule insti- 
tution, the least weight is put on the public 
information relative to the private information 
(Result 4). 
These patterns are consistent with a theory 
of strategic decision makers such as Bayesian- 
Nash equilibrium. Clearly, there is much work 
to be done in developing a model of how indi- 
viduals use the public information, together 
with their private information, and their beliefs 
about the behavior of others to come to their 
decisions. 
The pattern of results suggest two impor- 
tant messages. The first message is that pat- 
terns of conformity widely observed in social 
behavior can result from a deeper motivation 
than simply a "desire to conform." Decisions 
of others contain information that is important 
for incorporation with "own decisions." No- 
tice that even though cascades exist, they are 
not overwhelmingly inefficient. Indeed, "go- 
ing along with the group" is not all bad. It 
reflects an element of wisdom. For example, 
under the individualistic institution, the sys- 
tem efficiency would be 71.6 percent if all 
individuals made decisions according to their 
private information alone. If they were naive 
Bayesians the system efficiency would have 
been 83.1 percent. The actual efficiency was 
81.7 percent. Thus, the naive Bayesian behav- 
ior, which produces substantial cascades, also 
produces a substantial improvement in deci- 
sions from a social point of view. Interest- 
ingly enough, the fact that actual systemic 
efficiency falls short of that of naive 
Bayesians suggests that individuals do not 
pay enough attention to others. 
The second message is that care must be 
taken in the design of collective decision pro- 
cess. The rules of the institution make a differ- 
ence. In terms of information production, an 
outside observer learns the most from observing 
a majority rule process and the least from a 
conformity-rewarding process (Result 5). These 
differences are understandable in terms of ra- 
tional and strategic positions in which the rules 
place individuals. 
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